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Space, Supervenience and Substantivalism 
 
ROBIN LE POIDEVIN 
 
 
1. Why space needs supervenience 
 
Consider a straight line on a flat surface running from point A to C and passing 
though B. Suppose the distance AB to be four inches, and the distance BC to be six 
inches. We can infer that the distance AC is ten inches. Of all geometrical inferences, 
this is surely one of the simplest. Of course, things are a little more complicated if the 
surface is not flat. If A, B and C are points on a sphere, then the shortest distance 
between A and C may be smaller (it may even be zero). We can make our inference 
immune from concerns about non-Euclidean spaces, however, by qualifying it as 
follows: if AB = n, and BC = m, then, in the direction A⇒B⇒C, the distance AC is n 
+ m. This is apparently entirely trivial. But trivial truths can hide significant 
ontological ones. Let us translate our mathematical example to the physical world, 
and suppose A, B and C to be points, still in a straight line, but now at the centre of 
gravity of three physical objects:  
 
    A 
       
     B 
 
    C 
 
As before, AB + BC = AC (for the appropriate choice of direction in space⎯a 
qualification we will simply assume from now on). But these distances now represent 
(we suppose) real spatial relations between the objects. And, moreover, these relations 
themselves exhibit a close connection. 
 Reasonable though that last remark may seem, it rests on an assumption that 
we should make explicit. It can be expressed as a natural extension of the truth-maker 
principle that (at least some) truths are made true by something existing in reality 
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(see, e.g., Simons 2000 for articulation and defence). The natural extension of this, 
which we will call ‘the explanatory principle’, goes as follows: 
 
The explanatory principle: Where p entails q, there is a corresponding 
connection between the truth-makers of p and q that explains the entailment. 
 
In the case of our three objects, ‘AB = 4"’ and ‘BC = 6"’ together entail ‘AC = 10"’. 
What, in terms of the relations that provide the truth-makers of these propositions, 
explains this entailment? Here is the obvious answer: the spatial distance relation 
between A and C supervenes upon the distance relations AB and BC (what appears to 
be the only alternative, and rather unattractive, answer is briefly canvassed in §3). The 
truth-makers of the first two propositions thus together constitute the truth-maker of 
the third. 
 We are still in shallow waters, it seems. But they are about to become deeper, 
for that natural supervenience thesis raises difficulties for both sides of the traditional 
dispute over the nature of space: relationism and substantivalism. 
 
 
2. A problem for relationism 
 
According to substantivalism, spatial relations between objects exist by virtue of the 
fact that those objects are embedded within space, whose existence and nature is 
independent of those objects. This existential autonomy of space gains it the title of 
substance (though the notion often has additional connotations: Earman 1989: 111-
114). The holding of non-zero distance relations between any two objects thus entails 
the existence of a third object, a region of space (which may or may not be occupied), 
between them. As it is sometimes put, spatial relations are mediated by intervening 
points in space (Nerlich 1994: 18-20). For relationism, in contrast, space is not a 
substance. It is nothing over and above the system of spatial relations linking concrete 
entities. Spatial distance relations are thus direct or unmediated: they hold directly 
between objects, and are independent of any object other than their relata (Earman 
1989: 12; Dainton 2001: 141). There is no empty space between non-contiguous 
objects: there is just the holding of non-zero distance relations. Against the 
substantivalist’s insistence that unmediated spatial relations are unintelligible, the 
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relationist will reply that experience affords us nothing that could mediate them. Both 
sides of the dispute, however, agree that spatial relations are part of reality. And both 
sides, it seems, can make sense of the idea of alternative physical geometries. For the 
substantivalist, this is an issue about pathways through space. For the relationist, the 
geometry will be built into the relations between objects.  
The kind of relationism characterised here is the non-modal form. Other 
versions appeal to possibilia. Thus, the role played by the substantivalist’s unoccupied 
points is taken on in modal relationism by possibilities of location (Sklar 1985: 239-
40). Whether or not these possibilia are capable of taking on the formidable role 
expected of them⎯the individuation of unoccupied points, the mediation of spatial 
relations, the determination of the geometrical structure of space, the relationship 
between incongruent counterparts⎯is seriously open to question (Nerlich 1994: 21-2; 
Butterfield (1984)). I will say no more about this version of relationism, except to 
remark that, insofar as possibilia cannot mediate spatial relations, then modal 
relationism faces the problem I am about to articulate. Insofar as they can, it faces the 
problem for substantivalism articulated in §3. The essence of the contemporary 
dispute between relationism and substantivalism, I shall take it, is whether or not 
spatial relations are mediated. 
 Consider, then, two objects, A and C, whose centres lie at a distance of 10" 
from each other. No other object intervenes between them. Call the token distance 
relation they stand in to each other R1. R1 is, according to the relationist, unmediated 
and independent of any object other than A and C. A third object, B, is now placed 
between A and C. Two new distance relations have now come into existence: R2, 
linking A and B, and R3, linking B and C. However, since R1 is independent of any 
other object or relation, it continues to exist as an entirely distinct relation, linking A 
and C. R1 does not therefore supervene upon R2 and R3, since it existed before those 
relations came into being. Now suppose, as before, distance AB to be 4"and BC to be 
6". These together entail that AC = 10". The truth-makers of these propositions are, 
respectively, the relations (or facts about the relations) R2, R3 and R1. But since, as 
noted above, R1 is entirely independent of the other two relations, we lack an 
explanation, at the level of truth-makers, of this entailment. In order to satisfy the 
explanatory principle, the relationist is obliged to introduce a further relation, R4, 
which is wholly supervenient upon R2 and R3. R4, of course, is a distance relation 
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between A and C. The proposition AC = 10" now has two truth-makers, R1 and R4. 
But one of them⎯R4⎯is connected in the appropriate way with the truth-makers of 
‘AB = 4"’, and ‘BC = 6"’, and so the entailment is explained. 
 
 
    A 
       
     B 
 
    C R2 R3 
R1 
R4 
Non-supervenient relation 
Supervenient relation 
 
Although this overdetermination of truth is not itself an objection to the proposal 
(after all, the truth of ‘that rainbow is coloured’, just to give one example, is always 
overdetermined), there is something a little odd about R1 and R4 co-existing, yet 
independently of each other. It goes against the austere, frugal spirit of relationism. 
But it seems the relationist has no other choice. Keeping the non-supervenient R1 and 
rejecting the supervenient R4 as de trop means violating the explanatory principle. On 
the other hand, keeping the supervenient R4 and rejecting the non-supervenient R1 as 
de trop would undermine the relationist insistence that R1 is entirely unmediated and 
independent of any object between A and C. Why, if it were so independent, would 
the introduction of B destroy it? 
 If the worst that can befall relationism is a charge of ontological profligacy, 
then perhaps it has little to fear. There is, however, worse to come. For now we 
imagine A and C moving further apart, to a distance of 12". B remains between them, 
on the straight line AC. Supposing the distances AB and BC both to have increased, 
both R1 and R4 undergo a transformation. We can either say that they have remained, 
but have been extended, or we can say that they have been replaced by two new 
relations, R5 and R6. Either way, there has been a change. And, moreover, there could 
not have been a change in R1 without a corresponding change in R4, and vice versa. 
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But why, if they are entirely independent of each other? Supposing both R1 and R4 to 
have been extended, why should they have been extended by the same amount? 
Supposing both to have gone out of existence, why should the annihilation of the one 
have been accompanied by the annihilation of the other? Supposing both to have been 
replaced by just one relation, a relation that is supervenient on the distance relations 
between A and B, and between B and C, why should the fate of R1 (its replacement by 
a supervenient, rather than a non-supervenient relation) depend on the existence or 
non-existence of R4? The relationist has no explanation to offer. 
 
 
3. A substantivalist regress, and a conventionalist manoeuvre 
 
Substantivalists do not face this problem, since they regard any distance relation 
between A and C as supervenient on the relations between the points of space lying 
between them. These are quite independent of the comings and goings of any other 
objects in the vicinity of A and C. The distance relation between A and C on the one 
hand, and those between A and B, and B and C on the other, will depend on the same 
collection of spatial points and their relations. The connection between the distances 
is therefore explained. 
 However, although this deals with one problem⎯that of satisfying the 
explanatory principle, it raises another. Our intuitive conception of space represents it 
as infinitely divisible. For the relationist, this means just that there is no theoretical 
limit as to how close two objects can be (abstracting any considerations about the 
forces between objects). For the substantivalist, who accepts the existence of points, 
infinite divisibility has consequences for the number of points there are. Infinitely 
divisible and substantival space is characterisable in terms of what we may call the 
‘density postulate’, which we can state as follows:  
 
The density postulate: for any two spatial points, however close together, a 
straight line running from one to the other will always pass through a third point. 
 
The consequence is not just an infinite number of spatial relations between points, on 
which the distance relations between objects supervene, but an infinite regress of 
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supervenience relations. The relation between any two points will supervene on 
relations between each of those points and an intermediate point. Those relations will 
then supervene on relations with further intermediate points, and so on. Since the 
density postulate prevents there being any end to this regress of supervenience 
relations, we are left with the conclusion that, for the substantivalist, there is no 
determinate subvenient base. 
 Is this a worry for substantivalism? I think it is. It precisely parallels the ‘third 
man’ objection to realism about universals: if we suppose, as the realist does, the fact 
that a and b share a property obtains by virtue of the fact that a and b stand in the 
same relation to a universal, F, then that fact must obtain by virtue of the further fact 
that a’s relation to F and b’s relation to F both stand in the same relation to another 
universal, G, and so on. At no point is the relationship adequately grounded. (See 
Loux 2002: 36-7 for a slightly different presentation of the difficulty, and some 
responses to it.) So, if we take this to be a serious worry for realism about universals, 
we should take the parallel problem to be a serious worry for substantivalism. 
 A fundamental and unspoken component of the discussion so far has been an 
objectivist approach to spatial metric. We have taken it for granted, that is, that there 
is a fact of the matter, independently of any means of measuring them, as to whether 
any two distances are equivalent. Conventionalists about metric deny this (Grünbaum 
1970). Equivalence depends on a choice of measuring system. For some systems, the 
distances will be the same, for others, not. For the conventionalist, what explains the 
validity of our inferring distances AC from AB and BC is not the intrinsic features of 
spatial relations, but rather a wholly trivial feature of the measuring system. If, 
according to some conventionally chosen system, AB = 4 and BC = 6, then, simply as 
a matter of arithmetic, the system has delivered the result that AC is 10. (It is, of 
course, far from trivial that that same system would, if now employed to measure AC 
directly, deliver 10 as the result.) But conventionalism is a high price to pay, given the 
explanatory advantages objective metric brings (Nerlich 1994: 212-18).  
 So, it seems we have an uncomfortable set of choices. If we want to preserve 
an objectivist view of metric then, unless we allow that some spatial relations 
supervene on others, we cannot, at the ontological level, explain the validity of certain 
fundamental and unexceptionable geometrical inferences. But, once we accept this, 
we face a dilemma. We can choose a relationist view of space, on which supervenient 
and non-supervenient distance relations sit side by side, whose behaviour, though 
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independent, is precisely and mysteriously coincident. Or we can choose a 
substantivalist view of space, and a consequent infinite regress of supervenience 
relations, which leaves the existence of distance relations ultimately ungrounded. This 
array of uncongenial choices we will call ‘the Problem’. 
 
 
4. The Problem in other contexts:  time and non-Newtonian spacetimes 
 
Consider again the difficulty for spatial relationism raised in §2. Does relationism 
about time face a similar difficulty? It does if it introduces unmediated temporal 
distance relations, but perhaps there is no pressure to do so. The disanalogies between 
time and space may make different relationist treatments of them appropriate. For 
Newton-Smith, relationism (of the non-modal variety) is committed to denying the 
possibility of temporal vacua⎯periods of time without change (Newton-Smith 1980: 
14). The issue between substantivalists and relationists about time, thus construed, 
therefore centres on the possibility of such vacua. Now, if a non-zero interval between 
any two events is always filled by other events, then their temporal distance relation 
will supervene on the intervening relations, and there is no need to posit unmediated 
temporal relations. Or at least, there is no need if the temporal equivalent of the 
density postulate holds: that between any two moments there is always a third. But 
this postulate will then give rise to a regress precisely analogous to that faced by 
spatial substantivalists (§3). 
 Conversely, temporal relationists can remove themselves altogether from the 
debate over temporal vacua by introducing unmediated relations, and allowing that 
events can be separated by a non-zero interval, even in the absence of intervening 
events. (There is a strategic reason why temporal relationists may be unwilling to 
follow this path, namely that independent arguments against the possibility of 
temporal vacua would raise difficulties for substantivalism.) Of course, once they 
allow this, they would face the problem of accounting for the connection between 
supervenient and non-supervenient temporal relations⎯the counterpart of the 
difficulty in §2. We could not express it in precisely analogous terms, for what we 
were asking, in that earlier discussion, is what would happen to the various distance 
relations when we first introduced an intermediate object between A and C and then 
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moved A and C further apart. It would of course make no sense to talk of moving an 
event so that it occurred temporally between two other events, and then moving those 
events further apart in time. But we can, instead of thinking in terms of movement 
over time, compare possible worlds. In w1, two events, e and f, are separated by an 
interval, but no event occurs in that interval; in w2, there is the same interval between 
the events, but now there is an intervening event; and in w3 the same three events are 
separated by greater intervals. We can now ask questions about the various 
supervenient and non-supervenient temporal relations in these worlds, and their 
connections, in a way that precisely matches the questions we asked in the spatial 
case. For instance, in w2, are there two temporal distance relations between e and f, 
one supervenient, the other not? If so, and they are independent of each other, why do 
they correspond to the same distance? Do these relations exist in w3? If not, what are 
they replaced by? By just one relation? Why? And so on. As before, we have to posit 
connections for which there is no explanation. 
 Does the Problem only arise for Newtonian space and time? By no means. 
Suppose spacetime to be ‘neo-Newtonian’: that is, although there is an absolute 
ordering of events in time, and objective spatial relations between points at a time, 
there are no trans-temporal distance relations (Dainton 2001: 184). Still the Problem 
remains (or a spacetime counterpart of it), since neither the spatial nor the temporal 
version of it depends on trans-temporal spatial relations (vide the remark about 
possible worlds in the previous paragraph).  
 Suppose now that spacetime is relativistic: spatial and temporal intervals 
between events are relative to an inertial frame. Again, the Problem remains, although 
it should now be expressed in terms of frame-invariant spacetime relations. 
 
 
5. An atomistic solution 
 
Conventionalism over metric, a gaping explanatory lacuna, or a vicious infinite 
regress. Is the choice really as stark as this? Perhaps not quite. A radical way out for 
the substantivalist suggests itself: reject the density postulate. That is, give up the 
intuitive view of space (and time) as infinitely divisible in favour of a discrete 
ontology. In discrete space, each point has a unique neighbouring point in any given 
direction. In explaining spatial distance relations we can say one of two things: (a) 
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each point, though indivisible, has a non-zero extension, and spatial distance relations 
between points are simply a result of the number of intervening points (considered in 
Grünbaum 1970: §3); or (b) spatial distance relations between neighbouring points are 
unmediated. Distance relations between non-neighbouring points would then 
supervene on those more basic relations. Whichever of (a) or (b) we choose, since 
both posit a fundamental subvenient base, either would halt the regress. 
 Neither of these proposals is unproblematic. What account could (a) give of 
the size of what we might call ‘space atoms’? Ordinarily, we would think of an 
object’s size as a relational, though intrinsic, property: that is, as arising from relations 
amongst the object’s parts. But a space atom, being indivisible, has no parts. Size, as 
attached to the atom, would therefore have to be non-relational. But as a property of 
larger objects or regions of space, it would be relational. It is not clear that we can 
make sense of this suggestion. As for (b), by allowing the existence of unmediated 
spatial relations, the substantivalist somewhat weakens the case against relationism. 
Certainly, it would no longer be possible to complain that unmediated spatial relations 
are simply unintelligible.  
 My recommendation is that the substantivalist opt for (b). If the explanatory 
principle is to be satisfied and regress avoided, the substantivalist should countenance 
both mediated and unmediated spatial relations. The dispute with the relationist will 
then be over the existence of spatial points, rather than over the possibility of 
unmediated spatial relations.  
The atomistic picture of space that has emerged from this discussion is one 
some will find repugnant both to the intellect and to the imagination, but it does sit 
well with a thoroughgoing metaphysical finitism. 
 
University of Leeds 
Leeds LS2 9JT 
r.d.lepoidevin@leeds.ac.uk 
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